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uring the past few years, consumers,
politicians, academics, and interest
groups have expressed growing concern
about the safety of using cellular phones
in cars and trucks. The increasing use of cellular phones in
vehicles is part of a larger trend related to the introduction
of technologies that could divert attention from driving. A
recently published National Highway Trafﬁc Safety Admin-
istration (nhtsa) survey reports that 44 percent of dri-
vers have a phone with them when they drive, 7 percent have
e-mail access, and 3 percent have facsimile capabilities.
Those numbers are likely to increase. Other technologies
that increase possible distractions will also be added to
new vehicles, such as easily accessing the Internet, getting
directions electronically, and receiving real-time informa-
tion on trafﬁc patterns.
With mounting concern among the public about such dis-
tracting devices in vehicles, we think it is appropriate to under-
take a careful analysis of their advantages and disadvantages.
This paper focuses on cellular phone use in vehicles because
it is currently the most common of the new technologies.
We believe, however, that the methodology developed in this
paper could be helpful in assessing how best to address the use
of other distracting technologies in vehicles. 
Cellular phone subscribership in the United States has
grown dramatically in recent years, from 92,000 people in
1985 to more than 77,000,000 in 1999. Cellular phones in
cars provide important conveniences, including the abili-
ty to check on children, get help in an emergency, and coor-
dinate schedules. In addition, drivers sometimes use cellu-
lar phones to report accidents and alert police and
ﬁreﬁghters to problems that need to be addressed.
Unfortunately, cellular phones can also impose costs on
society. One of the potentially signiﬁcant costs of cellular
phone usage while driving is the increased risk of vehicle
accidents, some leading to serious injury or death. We esti-
mate that several hundred people die each year in the Unit-
ed States as a consequence of collisions related to cellular
phone use. While small in comparison to the 41,000 peo-
ple who die in all vehicle accidents each year in the United
States, municipalities, states, and even some countries have
proposed a large array of restrictions on the use of cellular
phones. Although only a few American municipalities have
implemented a ban on people’s use of hand-held cellular
phones while driving, several foreign countries have enact-
ed laws, including limited and total bans.
In this article we provide an economic evaluation of cel-
lular phone regulatory options. Our primary conclusion
is that banning cellular phone usage by drivers is a bad idea.
A ban in the United States is estimated to result in annu-
al economic welfare losses of about $20 billion. (All num-
bers are adjusted to 1999 dollars by using the consumer
price index. Calculations are generally rounded to two
significant digits.)
Less intrusive regulation, such as requiring the use of a
hands-free device that would allow a driver to use both
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Instead of direct regulation, we argue that the government
should focus on gathering additional information to deter-
mine the extent of the problem and also consider provid-
ing information to the public on the relative risk of cellular
phone use in vehicles.
CELLULAR PHONE REGULATION IN VEHICLES
on march 22, 1999, brooklyn, ohio, became theﬁrst city
in the United States to ban hand-held cellular phone use in
vehicles. Brooklyn’s ordinance bans the use of cellular
phones while driving unless drivers keep both hands on the
steering wheel. While the city has been enforcing that ordi-
nance aggressively, offenses are punishable only by a $3
ﬁne. Because Brooklyn was also the ﬁrst city to mandate the
use of seatbelts, media speculation surrounding the Brook-
lyn ordinance has focused on its potential national reper-
cussions. Following Brooklyn’s lead, other cities have imple-
mented similar laws. For example, Conshohocken, Hilltown
Township, and Lebanon in Pennsylvania and Marlboro
Township, New Jersey, have hands-free mandates similar to
Brooklyn’s ordinance, while New York City bans taxi and
limo drivers from using cellular phones.
No state has taken as aggressive a position as those
cities. As Table 1 shows, even the strictest state laws sim-
ply provide guidelines for the use of cellular phones in
vehicles. This table also shows, however, that several
states have legislative proposals that would ban some or
all uses of cellular phones while driving. These proposals,
like the existing city ordinances, allow drivers to place
emergency calls. States did not begin to address specific
concerns about cellular phones until 1987, and most
state legislative proposals have been introduced in the
past two years. The table shows that a total of 88 proposals
have been introduced at the state level in the past year.
Great variation exists across states in terms both of laws
and proposed legislation. 
States have enacted either very modest measures aimed
at regulating cellular phones or no measures at all. Most
existing state legislation focuses on gathering data and edu-
cating drivers who use cellular phones. Massachusetts has
the most stringent law of all the states, requiring drivers to
keep at least one hand on the wheel while talking on their
cellular phones. California’s law orders rental car dealers to
provide customers with instructions for the safe use of a cel-
lular phone in all rental cars with installed phones. Florida
prohibits the use of certain headset devices in conjunction
with a cellular phone because such devices impair a driver’s
ability to hear surrounding sounds of the road.
All states have laws designed to prevent inattentive dri-
ving. These laws aim to curtail a driver’s irresponsible
habits, but the laws are often vague, open to legal inter-
pretation, and poorly enforced. The concerns about cellu-
lar phone use while driving may lead many states to adopt
stricter inattentive-driving laws. Five states—Delaware,
Idaho, New Mexico, Ohio, and Wisconsin—recently spec-
ified unacceptable practices. It is unclear whether addi-
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tional efforts to strengthen these laws will affect driving
habits.
BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 
our basic finding is that the economic costs of a
banon cellular phone use in vehicles far outweigh the ben-
eﬁts. Therefore, we argue against a ban. The reason is sim-
ple—cellular phone use in vehicles provides substantial
benefits to users but does not appear to contribute to a
large number of serious accidents. Next, we make calcula-
tions addressing a more difﬁcult issue—whether particular
regulations mandating cellular phone innovations would
represent a relatively low-cost way of reducing accidents. As
an example, we consider the case of mandating a hands-free
device that is similar to a phone headset used in ofﬁce envi-
ronments. While the results are not as clear-cut as a ban, they
suggest that such regulation is probably not warranted on
beneﬁt-cost grounds. Next, we develop a calculation that
shows a break-even incremental cost for the regulation of
cellular phones, which could be useful to regulators who are
thinking about necessary conditions for intervening in this
technologically dynamic market. Finally, we review some
important limitations of our beneﬁt-cost analysis and we
highlight key insights.
Costs of a Ban The beneﬁt-cost analysis of a ban requires esti-
mating the cost to cellular phone users, the cost to pro-
ducers, and the monetized beneﬁts associated with a reduc-
tion in accidents. If cellular phone service is produced at
constant marginal costs, the costs of a ban to cellular phone
users is the welfare loss to consumers. Industrywide
demand functions for cellular phone service allow econo-
mists to approximate the economic loss to consumers from
a general ban. We estimate the amount of money that would
be necessary to compensate cellular phone users so they
would be indifferent to a ban.
Our analysis begins with an estimate by Hausman  of
industrywide demand for cellular phone services and then
uses that measure to approximate the loss to consumers
from a ban on using cellular phones in vehicles. Hausman
ﬁnds that the price elasticity of cellular phone demand is
–0.51, meaning that a 10 percent reduction in cellular ser-
vice pricing would increase demand by 5.1 percent. This
result is consistent with our own unpublished analysis
using 1999 data. Based on Hausman’s calculations that use
1994 data, we estimate that consumers in the United States
would need to receive at least $27 billion a year to be indif-
ferent to a ban. Using a linear approximation, we ﬁnd that
this number would now exceed $41 billion, employing
1999 price and subscribership ﬁgures.
The proportion of total cellular phone revenues arising
from calls occurring in vehicles multiplied by the total
amount that consumers would have to be compensated
yields an estimate of the cost to consumers of prohibiting
cellular phone use by drivers. This estimate assumes that cel-
lular phone demand by drivers resembles the total cellular
demand analyzed by Hausman. Using an industry market-
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State Mandated Guidelines   Heightened User Ban on All Total Ban  Total Number
Data for Cell Penalties in Hand-Held  on All Cell  of Proposals
Collection Phone Use Contributing to Devices Phone Useb since 1999
an Accident
Arizona P P 1
California Fc (1987) 0
Colorado P 1
Connecticut P P 4
Delaware P 1
Florida Fd (1992) 0
Georgia P P P P 7






Louisiana P P 2
Maine P 1
Maryland P P 2
Massachusetts Fe (1990), P Pf 2
Michigan P P P 3




New Hampshire P P 2
New Jersey P P P 6
New York P P P P 19
Ohio P P 1
Oklahoma Fh (1992) 0
Oregon P P P 3
Pennsylvania P P P P 8
Rhode Island P P 4
South Carolina P 1
Texas P 1
Virginia Pi 1
Washington P P 2
West Virginia P 1
Wyoming P 1
Note:P = Proposed Legislation F = Finalized Legislation
Table 1
Finalized and Recently Proposed Cellular Phone Legislationa
aProposed state legislation in this table dates back
to January 1, 1999. Finalized legislation, however,
spans the entire history of this legislative issue.
bMost proposed legislation banning the use of cellu-
lar phones permits emergency calls and allows a
one- or two-minute grace period for pulling off to
the side of the road. 
cIn California, rental cars with cellular telephone
equipment must include written operating
instructions concerning its safe use. 
dCellular phone use in Florida is permitted as long
as the device provides sound through one ear and
allows surrounding sound to be heard with the
other ear. 
eCellular phone use in Massachusetts is permitted
as long as it does not interfere with the operation of
the vehicle and one hand remains on the steering
wheel at all times. 
fThis piece of legislation only applies to school bus
drivers. 
gThis statute requires police ofﬁcers to indicate on
motor vehicle accident reports whether or not cellu-
lar phone use played a part in the accident.
hThis statute requires police ofﬁcers to indicate on
motor vehicle accident reports whether or not cellu-
lar phone use played a part in the accident.
iThis piece of legislation only applies to school bus
drivers.
Sources:“Cell Phones and Driving: 1999 State Leg-
islative Update.” NCSL, 1999. Environment, 
Energy, and Transportation Program. <http://www.
ncsl.org/programs/esnr/celphone.htm>.
Legislative Tracking Database provided by the
National Highway and Transportation Safety Board
in conjunction with the National Conference of
State Legislatures.<http://www.nhtsa
.dot.gov/ncsl> (Legislative year: 2000. View Avail-
able Records: Cell Phone Issue).
National Highway Trafﬁc Safety Administration,
1997, State Net search through Lexis Nexis.
Personal communication with ComCARE Alliance
(1999). 
“Spring 2000, Telecommunications Report.”
StateScape. June 30, 2000: 59.
Allyson Vaughn. “Missouri: Jail Time for Car-Phone
Use?” Wireless Week, February 7, 2000.
<http://www.wirelessweek.com/news/feb00/ftwo2
7.htm>.
Allyson Vaughn. “Driving, Talking Targeted Again.”
Wireless Week, April 3, 2000. <http://www 
.wirelessweek.com/News/safety/in43.htm>.
ing survey conducted by the Yankee Group, we estimate that
consumers spend 60 percent of their cellular phone time
while driving. This estimate would imply that, for con-
sumers to remain indifferent between a ban and no ban, they
would need to be paid about $25 billion if they were not
allowed to use their cellular phones while driving.
Beneﬁts of a Ban Economists can measure the costs of cel-
lular phone use by drivers in terms of the lostlives, property
damage, and injury costs of accidents associated with dri-
ver use. Collisions are caused by several contributing factors,
so it is difﬁcult to attribute all the costs to a single factor, such
as the use of a cellular phone. In our cost estimates, we
assumed that drivers using cellular phones did not take
into account any of the accident risks. If drivers did take
account of some or all of these risks, the demand curve
would reflect that. Counting them again would bias our
beneﬁt-cost analysis in favor of a ban.
The best estimate of accidents and fatalities was based
primarily on the available data from actual accident reports
and narratives at the state and national level. We also used
an influential epidemiological study by Redelmeier and
Tibshirani. We chose to construct our best estimate based
on a careful, subjective weighting of these two data sources.
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were likely to yield a more reliable measure of the impact
of cellular phones on vehicle accidents and fatalities. Our
upper bound is generated by using an estimate of risk of dri-
ving from the epidemiological study.
We used state and national accident data to generate four
different estimates of the number of accidents associated
with cellular phones. For the purposes of this analysis, we will
assume that those accidents are actually caused by drivers’ use
of cellular phones. The lowest estimate is that fewer than 3 in
every 10,000 accidents were related to driver cellular phone
use in 1999. The highest estimate from state data is that cel-
lular phones were associated with 1 in every 1,000 vehicle acci-
dents. Weighting the four estimates equally–two from state
data and two from national data–yields an estimate that 2 out
of every 1,000 accidents were associated with driver cellular
phone use. The state and national data imply that about 80
fatalities out of 41,000 national fatalities each year are asso-
ciated with cellular phone use in cars. If only 3 in every 10,000
accidents are related to driver cellular phone use, then only
10 fatalities a year are associated with cellular phone use in
cars. We will use that estimate as our lower bound.
Redelmeier and Tibshirani estimated the relative risk of
talking on a cellular phone while driving was 4.3 for acci-
dents not involving injuries. It is not clear that the same risk
factor holds for more serious accidents. Assuming that it
does, the probability of having an accident while using a cel-
lular phone is 4.3 times the probability of having an accident
when not using a cellular phone. 
It may not be appropriate to use that risk factor to
extrapolate to an estimate of cellular phone accidents
nationally. Cellular phone users may not be representative
of the general driving population and may not use their
phones for the same proportion of time during all driving
conditions. If cellular phone users are safer than average
drivers or if they use their phones during relatively safe
periods, then a direct extrapolation using the risk factor
of 4.3 would overestimate the number of accidents. In
addition, drivers may be willing to take small risks of get-
ting in minor accidents as Redelmeier and Tibshirani have
shown. This finding does not necessarily imply that these
same drivers would take a comparable risk if the conse-
quences were death. We also believe that those who use cel-
lular phones while driving are likely to be better educat-
ed and have higher incomes, on average, than other
drivers. Such characteristics may make them more care-
ful than average drivers to avoid fatal accidents. Because
of these potential biases, we treat the risk factor of 4.3 as
an upper bound.
Using that risk factor, we developed an upper bound
estimate of fatalities related to cellular phone use. Using
survey data, we estimate that 0.7 percent of driving time
is spent on a cellular phone. Assuming drivers using cel-
lular phones are as safe as average drivers and drive under
similar conditions, we estimate that 3 percent (0.7 times
4.3) of accidents occur while a driver is talking on a
phone. Subtracting the general risks from traveling in a
vehicle implies that about 2.3 percent of accidents are
attributable to the use of a cellular phone while driving.
This percentage implies that about 1,000 out of 41,000 dri-
ving-related fatalities annually are caused by cellular
phones. 
If we assume that cellular phones increase the risk of
minor accidents, injury accidents, and fatal accidents equal-
ly, our estimates suggest between 10 and 1,000 fatalities
are associated with or caused by cellular phones. After con-
sidering the concerns about the two estimates, we decided
to calculate our best estimate by taking a weighted average
of our estimates from crash data and the epidemiological
study. We used 300 as our best estimate of the number of
fatalities caused by cellular phones. We used the estimate
based on the relative risk as our upper bound.  In summa-
ry, we estimated cellular phone use in vehicles causes 300
fatalities per year, with a range of 10 to 1,000 fatalities.
Assuming the same percentage of accidents as fatalities
yields a best estimate of 38,000 accidents involving injuries,
with a range of 1,300 to 130,000.
We then placed a dollar value on those estimates of
accidents. Our analysis draws heavily on a study by nhtsa
(1994), which monetizes the economic costs of motor vehi-
cle accidents. The study found that trafﬁc accidents result
in annual losses of about $170 billion. By chance, the total
numbers of crashes and fatalities in 1994 were almost exact-
ly the same as projections for 1999. Thus, the 1994 data offer
a reasonable approximation of economic costs of accidents
in 1999. The $170 billion ﬁgure represents the present value
of lifetime economic costs for 41,000 fatalities, 5.2 million
nonfatal injuries, 3.7 million uninjured occupants, and 27
million damaged vehicles. These accidents include both
police-reported and unreported accidents. Most of the $170
billion in nhtsa’s calculation stems from lost productiv-
ity in the workplace and direct medical expenses.
nhtsa’s measures of costs take account of only direct
costs but do not consider what an individual would be will-
ing to pay to reduce mortality and morbidity risks. If we use
Viscusi’s 1993 willingness-to-pay estimate of $5 million
per statistical life, adjusted to $6.6 million to account for
inﬂation, nhtsa’s estimate would increase from $170 bil-
lion to $410 billion. If willingness to pay to prevent injuries
(morbidity) were taken into account, nhtsa’s estimate
would increase to $630 billion. That amount is our best
estimate of the total annual cost of motor vehicle accidents.
Estimating that cellular phone use contributes to just
under 0.74 percent of total accidents, we calculated the
costs of drivers’ cellular phone use to be $4.6 billion per year
(0.0074 times $630 billion). About half of this $4.6 billion
is attributable to the 300 estimated fatalities associated
with driver use of cellular phones, while the other half rep-
resents the costs associated with more minor accidents in
which cellular phones were a contributing factor.
Net Beneﬁts of a BanOn the basis of the preceding cost and
benefit estimates, national legislation banning cellular
phone use by drivers would impose annual net costs of
Regulation 49 Volume 23, No. 3
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beneﬁts). Indeed, the costs of a ban are more than ﬁve times
greater than the beneﬁts. These results are summarized in
the ﬁrst part of Table 2 as our best estimate.
A great deal of uncertainty exists in many of the para-
meter values used in our model. To account for key uncer-
tainties, we considered a wide range of parameter values for
the number of lives saved, the amount of time drivers
spend using a cellular phone, and the price elasticity of
demand. A range of 10 to 1,000 is used for lives saved,
based on a lower bound from nhtsa’s study of North
Carolina crash narratives and an upper bound from an
extrapolation from Redelmeier and Tibshirani’s estimate
of relative risk. Hausman’s estimate for price elasticity
applies to all cellular phones, not only phones in vehicles.
To account for that additional source of uncertainty, we
used a range of –0.17 to –0.84 for price elasticity, based on
two of Hausman’s standard error estimates. A range of 40
percent to 70 percent was used for the percentage of time
cellular phones are used by drivers. The lower-bound esti-
mate assumes passengers use cellular phones propor-
tionally to drivers while our best estimate assumes that pas-
sengers rarely use phones.
The qualitative nature of our ranges does not allow us to
provide precise conﬁdence intervals. To present this uncer-
tainty, we ﬁrst calculated the minimum and maximum costs,
beneﬁts, and net beneﬁts by choosing the most extreme val-
ues for all parameters simultaneously. The results are pre-
sented in the last column of Table 2. For example, the bene-
ﬁts of a ban range from at least zero to $21 billion, which
primarily reﬂects the large uncertainty in the number of
fatalities associated with cellular phone use. This approach
creates the largest plausible ranges, although it is unlikely that
the costs, beneﬁts, or net beneﬁts are near the ends of those
ranges. Such a result would require unlikely values for all
our estimates simultaneously. For that reason, the ranges
presented in Table 2 overstate the uncertainty in our results.
Another approach to illustrating the sensitivity of the
results is shown in Figure 1, which shows the effect of vary-
ing one parameter at a time. By varying each parameter, we
are able to determine the most important uncertainties.
We use a plausible range for each key variable and calculate
the corresponding range of net beneﬁts. Varying the price
elasticity of demand yields net cost estimates ranging from
$14 billion to $73 billion. Varying fatality and injury esti-
mates also generates a large range for net costs, but even if
cellular phones cause 1,000 fatalities a year, a ban would still
result in net costs of $9 billion annually. Only when
extremely conservative estimates are used for both the
number of fatalities and the price elasticity of demand do
we calculate positive net benefits. Because that result
requires extreme assumptions for two variables simulta-
neously, we feel that it is extremely unlikely for the beneﬁts
of a ban to exceed the costs. We found that for most plau-
sible ranges for parameter values, a ban on cellular phones
while driving cannot be justiﬁed for the United States on nar-
row grounds of economic efﬁciency.
Hands-Free Mandate Despite that strong evidence that a ban
would not pass a beneﬁt-cost test, less draconian policies
could still be justiﬁed. For example, a policy that mandates
the use of a hands-free device in conjunction with a con-
ventional cellular phone would allow consumers to reap
many of the beneﬁts of using phones while driving, albeit at
some additional cost. At the same time, such a mandate
could reduce the number of accidents by freeing a driver’s
hands. Other approaches, such as a policy requiring voice-
activated dialing or one restricting who may use a phone or
under what conditions, may also be justiﬁed but we did not
make those calculations because of a dearth of data.
We analyze the economics of a hands-free mandate
and assume that drivers using cellular phones would pur-
chase the least expensive hands-free technology. We deﬁne
the least expensive device as the one that provides the low-
est net cost to consumers after they have already taken into
account the convenience of the device and the time it takes
to shop for it. The least expensive hands-free device, ignor-
ing convenience beneﬁts and shopping costs, has a price of
$20 to $60, depending on the model of phone. A hands-free
mandate would force people who currently own a phone to
make an extra trip to purchase the hands-free device. After
a hands-free mandate is in place, people would presumably
purchase the hands-free device concurrently with their
new phone purchase and thereby save time, but in this
example we include the additional search costs. We assume
that the opportunity cost of time for cellular phone users
is $20 per hour. Each person who uses a hand-held phone
in a vehicle is assumed to spend 30 minutes shopping for a
hands-free device; thus, the search cost is $10. Adding the
search cost to the price of the phones produces a range of
$30 to $70 for the full cost of the device with an average price
of $50. If we assume that consumers do not incur losses in
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Table 2
Beneﬁts and Costs of Policies Regulating 
Cellular Phones in Vehicles (in millions of dollars)
Ban on the Use of Cellular Phones While Driving
Best Estimate Range a
Beneﬁts $4,600 $110 to $21,000
Costs $25,000 $10,000 to $87,000
Net Beneﬁts b,c ($20,000) ($87,000) to $6,800 d
Mandate for Hands-Free Devices
Plausible Estimate Range a
Beneﬁts $690 $0 to $6,300
Costs $1400 $100 to $7600
Net Beneﬁts  ($710) ($7600) to $6,200
Sources: Hausman (1997), NHTSA (1996, 1997, 1998, 1999).
a Ranges are determined by taking maximum and minimum values of key parameters.
b Numbers in parentheses are negative.
d The upper bound on beneﬁts and the lower bound on costs cannot occur at the same time
because they assume different levels of penetration. The $6,800 ﬁgure represents the maxi-
mum net beneﬁts when the penetration rate in the cost and beneﬁt calculation is the same.
Hahn.2Final  9/30/00  1:36 PM  Page 50convenience for having that device in their car, we can place
an upper bound of the net costs of such a device at $50.
Those users have not purchased that device on their own,
so their revealed preference suggests that the lower bound
on the net costs is slightly more than zero. We take the
average of those two extremes as our best estimate of the
net costs of obtaining such a device. Assuming the device
lasts for three years, we calculate an amortized cost of pur-
chasing the device to be $9 annually. 
After individuals purchase their devices, the hands-free
mandate would also require them to use the device for
every phone call that they make while driving. Drivers had
the option to do so without that requirement, however.
Such a requirement therefore will not make drivers better
off and may be inconvenient. It is difﬁcult to calculate the
costs of that possible inconvenience but we offer the fol-
lowing example of how it might be done. If one assumes that
the average person drives two times a day, prepares the
cellular phone for use in the vehicle, and that it takes 15 sec-
onds to plug the device into the phone and install the ear-
piece, the user would spend 3 hours a year connecting and
disconnecting the device. At $20 per hour, this example
suggests that the annual inconvenience costs could be on
the order of $60. We do not believe that the inconvenience
would necessarily be close to $60 annually for the average
user, due to offsetting utility gains from using the device. For
purposes of this calculation, we use $15 annually as our best
estimate of the inconvenience cost.
Adding the $9 purchase cost and the $15 inconvenience
cost produces a plausible estimate of $24 for those indi-
viduals using cellular phone in cars who do not currently
own a hands-free device. We call this a plausible estimate
to reﬂect the large uncertainty in our calculation. 
This estimate ignores some other potentially impor-
tant costs. For example, people may simply dislike using
the hands-free device. Moreover, attaching the device
while driving could actually increase
risks. Unfortunately, we do not have
any data or reasonable ways of bound-
ing such costs.
Net Benefits of a Hands-Free Mandate
Multiplying the 60 million affected cel-
lular phone users (23 percent of the 77
million cellular phone users do not oper-
ate hand-held phones while driving) by
the net cost of about $24 per user yields
our plausible estimate that a hands-free
mandate would cost $1.4 billion. Using
this estimate and our best estimates for
all risk variables, we ﬁnd that hands-free
regulation would fail a beneﬁt-cost test
unless it resulted in roughly a 25 per-
cent reduction in accidents related to
cellular phone use.
According to evidence from acci-
dent data in Japan and North Carolina,
about 15 percent of cellular-related collisions could have
been avoided if the drivers had been using hands-free
devices. This estimate is very uncertain because the stud-
ies on which they are based suffered from a lack of data and
did not focus particular attention on the safety of hands-
free devices.
A 25 percent reduction in accidents from hands-free reg-
ulation seems unlikely, so proposals to ban hand-held
phones fail our beneﬁt-cost test unless consumers receive
larger convenience and safety benefits from hands-free
devices than we assume in our example. The conclusion is
dependent on the number of fatalities attributable to cellular
phones. If evidence reveals that cellular phones cause sig-
niﬁcantly more fatalities than our best estimate of 300, a
hands-free mandate would pass our beneﬁt-cost test. 
The second part of Table 2 presents best estimates and
ranges for the benefits and costs of a hands-free device
mandate in the United States. The beneﬁt of this mandate
is equal to the beneﬁt of a ban times the percentage of acci-
dents reduced. Our illustrative estimate is that a hands-
free mandate would cost users $23 per year, which implies
a total cost of $1.4 billion annually. If we assume a 15 per-
cent accident reduction, the benefits would be roughly
$700 million, suggesting net costs of $700 million. Our
estimated net beneﬁts range between $6.2 billion and neg-
ative $7.6 billion. The range of net benefits is very large
because of the large uncertainty in the number of fatalities
and injuries reduced by a hands-free mandate. 
While it is possible future information will reveal that
a hands-free mandate is cost-effective, we would be reluc-
tant to recommend a mandate at this point. We believe a
mandate would not be warranted because the data on the
effectiveness of these devices are very uncertain and our
analysis suggests that a mandate would not pass a beneﬁt-
cost test. Moreover, the introduction of other technolo-
gies, such as voice activation, could reduce the need for
Regulation 51 Volume 23, No. 3
Willingness to pay to
avoid statistical fatalities
and injuries ($3.6 million 
to $9.6 million per fatality)
Number of fatalities and
injuries (10 to 1000
fatalities annually)
Price elasticity of
demand (-.084 to -.017)
Percentage of total
cell phone usage spent
in cars (40% to 70%)
Combined range 
(all variables)
-100 -90 -80 -70 -60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20
Annual Net Beneﬁts (billions of dollars)
Sources: Hausman (1997), NHTSA (1997), Viscusi (1993), and author’s calculations.
Figure 1
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be wary about mandating a technology whose efﬁcacy is
questionable and which may be superseded or comple-
mented by new technologies that are safer.
A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY EVALUATION
given the limited data, we have been able to evalu-
ate quantitatively only two options for regulating cellular
phones while driving—a ban and a mandate of hands-free
devices. Because the cellular phone industry is so dynam-
ic, a framework for analyzing future technological devel-
opments could assist regulators in making informed deci-
sions. Figure 2 provides such a framework. It presents a
graph of the tradeoff between accident reduction and the
cost of regulation to cellular phone subscribers which was
obtained from our model. The positive slope of the line
illustrates that as a technology or policy increases in cost,
it needs to be more effective in reducing risks for it to pass
a beneﬁt-cost test or a cost-effectiveness test. A proposal
lying above the line in the graph is not cost effective in the
sense that it fails to reduce accidents sufﬁciently to justify
its expense. For the case of mandating hands-free devices,
analyzed earlier, the figure shows that the area corre-
sponding to the plausible range of accident reduction and
cost per subscriber falls almost entirely outside the cost-effec-
tive region. This result suggests that a hands-free mandate
is not likely to be economically justiﬁed. 
To illustrate the power of this framework, consider the
following example. Assume that built-in, voice-activated
technology on cellular phones prevents half of all accidents
related to cellular phone use and that consumers derive no
utility from the technology. From Figure 2, we see that a tech-
nology that reduces accidents by 50 percent would pass a
beneﬁt-cost test if it costs no more than about $30 per sub-
scriber annually. 
The framework underlying Figure 2 can also accom-
modate changes in a variety of key assumptions. For exam-
ple, a critical concern is how accidents could be affected by
increases in drivers’ cellular phone use in vehicles. Some
would argue that the risks will increase more than pro-
portionally if the number of drivers using cellular phones
increases. Current data do not support that view, however.
Predictions of fatalities from driver cellular phone use that
are based on linear extrapolations from previous years
overestimate today’s observed fatalities. The important
point for analysis is that both views can easily be accom-
modated in Figure 2 by simply adjusting the slope of the line
to reﬂect particular cases of interest. 
We emphasize that this framework provides a useful tool
for examining different policy options. However, we think
that it is not deﬁnitive because there are many uncertainties
and biases not addressed in our analysis and because other
factors may be important in the design of policy. For exam-
ple, if society values accident reductions to average citi-
zens at a premium relative to its valuation of the welfare
gains that drivers using cellular phones receive, then the
slope of the line in Figure 2 would increase.
POSSIBLE CRITIQUES OF OUR ANALYSIS
the preceding analysis leaves out at least three
important factors that could alter our policy conclusions:
our demand elasticity estimates; the possibility of substi-
tution to other risky behavior; and how policies are actu-
ally enforced.
Demand Elasticity  The demand curve used in our analysis
describes the cellular service industry as a whole. It does not
explicitly consider the ease with which consumers can switch
between using cellular phones in vehicles and cellular phones
in other places, such as at the ofﬁce or on the street. Our
demand curve considers only the ease of switching cellular
phone calls with other types of communication methods
like pager calls and traditional landline calls. This demand
curve is not valid if replacing in-vehicle calls from cellular
phones with out-of-vehicle cellular phone calls (i.e., if the dri-
ver pulls to the side of the road before calling) is easier for con-
sumers than replacing in-vehicle calls from cellular phones
with landline calls (the demand curve for cellular phones
while driving would be more elastic than the one Hausman
estimates for the entire industry). In that case, our estimate
of the cost of a policy intervention limiting cellular phone use
while driving is likely to be overstated.
It is unlikely, however that the price elasticity will be suf-
ﬁciently high to change our ultimate conclusions with respect
to a ban. For a ban to pass a beneﬁt-cost test, the absolute value
of the price elasticity required is at least three. Thus, if a 3 per-
cent reduction in cellular calls made while driving results
from a 1 percent increase in the price of calls from vehicles,
then a ban might increase economic welfare. Because many
businesspeople place a high value on their time, however, calls
made while commuting to work are unlikely to be dramati-
cally affected by a 1-percent increase in this price. 
The bias is also not very likely to affect the qualitative
conclusion on net benefits for a hands-free technology
mandate. The decision to implement hands-free technolo-
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number of consumers would choose to forgo vehicle calls
altogether when confronted with hands-free regulation, a
situation we consider unlikely.
Substitution Effects A second potential source of bias in
our results lies in the driver response to hands-free regula-
tion or an outright ban. The analysis implicitly assumes
that the driver will not engage in other risky driving behav-
iors as a result of that policy intervention. If drivers instead
respond to regulation by performing other distracting tasks
in place of using the phone, the gross accident ﬁgures from
nhtsadata systematically overstate the extent to which a
ban would help. In fact, we do not know whether a driver
would be likely to engage in more or less risky behavior. It
is highly unlikely, however, that the intervention would
result in changes in driving behavior that are riskless.
In an extreme scenario, one could imagine a driver’s
performing a task more distracting than talking on a phone
under a ban. More than half of all cellular phone users
have used their phones to call for directions according to
a 1995 Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association
survey. Drivers who value their time may need directions
to a destination. With access to phones, they may elect to
call from their vehicle for directions. Without access to
phones, they may attempt to read a map while they are dri-
ving. According to the Transportation Research Institute,
reading a map is actually more distracting than talking on
a phone. In this example, a ban would increase the risk a
driver imposes on others.
While we are not arguing that overall risks would
increase, we are arguing that the gross number of acci-
dents and fatalities associated with cellular phones is like-
ly to overstate the actual risk that is reduced from a poli-
cy intervention perhaps by a large amount. Drivers,
especially those who are as time-conscious as the drivers
using cellular phones, will increase the amount of time
they spend on other distracting tasks if they are not per-
mitted to use their cellular phones while driving. If cellu-
lar phone use in vehicles were banned, we would not be sur-
prised to see additional fatalities resulting from such tasks
as eating, tuning a radio, talking to a passenger, or surfing
the Web . Indeed, nhtsaestimates that fatalities associated
with accidents from such inattentive driving activities
number 4,000 annually, compared with a best estimate of
300 resulting from cellular phones.
Another important factor that could lead to overesti-
mation of net fatalities is the impact a ban would have on
reporting potential problems to authorities. Although most
of the proposed regulations would exempt cellular phone
use in an emergency, a ban on nonemergency use would
tend to decrease the instances of people’s carrying phones
in their cars. The safety-enhancing effect of ubiquitous cel-
lular phones is a byproduct of having the phones available
for other uses. Thus, some of the positive social impacts of
cellular phones, like the quicker reporting of accidents, for
example, would be reduced. 
The effect of overestimating accidents and fatalities on
our results would be to make the proposed ban and the man-
date to use hands-free devices look less attractive from an
economic point of view. Because they already are unlikely
to pass a beneﬁt-cost test, that effect is unlikely to change
our qualitative results.
Enforcement A ﬁnal key issue that needs to be addressed is how
a policy is actually enforced. Our calculations have assumed
that policies are perfectly enforced. We know that in many
countries these policies are either not enforced or that
enforcement is far from perfect. Moreover, some of the poli-
cies may be quite costly and difﬁcult to enforce. Imagine, for
example, trying to enforce a total ban in the United States. Dri-
vers who use cellular phones could respond by putting tint-
ed glass in their vehicles, which would make phone use hard-
er to detect. Many cab drivers in New York City use hands-free
devices, possibly, in part, to avoid detection.
Less than perfect enforcement is likely to reduce both
the costs and the beneﬁts of the two policies considered here.
A plausible assumption is that the costs and the beneﬁts will
be reduced proportionally. If beneﬁts and costs are reduced
proportionally when a policy is imperfectly enforced, then
the qualitative relationship between beneﬁts and costs is not
likely to change.
The proportionality assumption may not be realistic,
however. Suppose, for example, that those users who ben-
eﬁt most from cellular service would be the ones willing to
risk getting caught. Under such circumstances, the cost of
regulation would decrease dramatically if the law were
poorly enforced. The people getting the most surplus from
cellular service would be the people who break the law.
But if the citizens receiving the greatest surplus from cellular
phones are also the citizens who are most likely to abide by
the law, a ban would have relatively greater costs. Without
more detailed information, it is difﬁcult to know how imper-
fect enforcement will affect costs and beneﬁts.
Another important issue related to enforcement arises
if the police have a fixed amount of resources. If some
resources were devoted to enforcing driver cellular phone
regulations, then some beneﬁts would presumably be for-
gone elsewhere because other policies would be enforced
with less vigilance. Without more information, it is difﬁcult
to know whether that issue is important empirically.
Our basic conclusion is that the enforcement consid-
erations could be important determinants of the total level
of net beneﬁts achieved from the policies considered here.
At the same time, they are not very likely to change the
qualitative results.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
regulation of the use of cellular phones by drivers
is now commonplace outside the United States and has been
proposed in a number of jurisdictions in the United States.
On beneﬁt-cost grounds alone, a proposed ban and a man-
date to use hands-free devices are not likely to be justified
in the United States. We are less sure whether such policies
Regulation 53 Volume 23, No. 3
Hahn.2Final  9/30/00  1:36 PM  Page 53are justified elsewhere because of an absence of data, nor
does our analysis consider the effect of a ban or hands-free
mandate on particularly accident-prone subpopulations.
We doubt that the net benefits from a ban on drivers’
use of cellular phones would be significant for three rea-
sons. First, the results of our quantitative benefit-cost
analysis suggest that costs are likely to exceed benefits
under a range of assumptions. Second, our best estimates
of accident and fatality reductions do not take into account
how drivers would alter their behavior in response to reg-
ulation. If regulations were enforced, drivers might sim-
ply switch to other risky behaviors. Thus, the net reduc-
tions in accidents and fatalities are likely to be overstated,
which means that the benefits of regulatory interventions
could be quite small. Third, the technology is already
moving in the direction of voice-activated cellular calls,
which could reduce risks.
The economic analysis of mandating drivers’ use of
hands-free devices is less conclusive. Our beneﬁt-cost analy-
sis suggests that such devices may be justiﬁed, but the uncer-
tainties on both the beneﬁts and costs are large. Without
stronger data supporting the view that such devices actu-
ally reduce accidents and fatalities, we would be reluctant
to recommend requiring their introduction.
It is likely that the market will more effectively address
risks associated with cellular phone usage than would high-
ly regulatory government intervention. As an example,
several cellular phone makers and service providers have
recently introduced voice-recognition technology.
If the problem with using cellular phones while driving
becomes severe enough, vehicle insurance companies may
begin to classify drivers who use cellular phones in higher-
risk groups and charge those drivers commensurately high-
er insurance premiums. Because an insurance company
bears the burden of reimbursing injured parties for their
losses, a rational company would consider charging drivers
who use cellular phones higher premiums to compensate for
any increased risk that cellular phone use forces the company
to assume. Insurance companies are not likely to introduce
such pricing schemes if the transaction costs of doing so
exceed the private beneﬁts to the company.
Instead of regulating now, the government should care-
fully monitor the problem and improve the information base
for making regulatory decisions. It is possible that fatalities
are signiﬁcantly underestimated now. Moreover, an argu-
ment can be made that accidents will increase more than lin-
early as more drivers use cellular phones. Finally, tech-
nologies could emerge that the government should
encourage. To address those issues, the federal government
and the states should collect more systematic information
on the possible relationship between cellular phone use
while driving and accidents. 
The government should also assess the benefits and
costs of mandating the use of promising new technolo-
gies, such as voice activation, as well as older ones, such as
hands-free devices. More research on the effectiveness of
hands-free devices in countries and municipalities that
have required their use could help determine whether these
devices should be encouraged. There is also a need for
research on the extent to which cellular phones increase net
accidents and fatalities, while taking into account the poten-
tial positive impacts that cellular phones could have on the
reporting of hazards and accidents.
Simple improvements in information collection could
help reduce uncertainty. If all states included a statistic in
their accident reports describing whether the driver was
using a cellular phone at the time of a collision, the result-
ing national data would be much more reliable. Similar
additions to the Fatality Analysis Reporting System,
endorsed by nhtsa, could substantially improve the fed-
eral database. 
Government may also have a role in providing easily
accessible information to consumers on the risks of differ-
ent kinds of cellular phone usage. A number of parties cur-
rently supply such information, including newspapers,
companies, and interest groups, so the government needs
to be careful not to duplicate their efforts. 
A useful role the government could play is to help sort
out high risks from low risks. For example, some gas stations
have banned the use of cellular phones while refueling. We
think the risks of serious accidents in this situation are
likely to be minimal, and the government could play a use-
ful role here by providing information that could reduce
“cell-phone phobia” in areas where it is not justiﬁed. 
The general lesson we take from this analysis is that
the mere existence of a problem does not, by itself, warrant
government intervention. Our review of the available data
suggests that drivers’ cellular phone usage does lead to an
increase in accidents and fatalities. It is not obvious, how-
ever, that feasible government policies would signiﬁcantly
reduce the size of the problem. Moreover, for government
intervention to be warranted, a strong case needs to be
made that the likely economic beneﬁts exceed the costs by
a signiﬁcant amount. Our analysis suggests that the case has
yet to be made for regulating drivers who use cellular
phones; however, a more tempered response, in which gov-
ernment continues to assess the size of the problem, pro-
vide useful information, and fund research, is warranted.
The problem of regulating potentially risky technolo-
gies in vehicles is not likely to go away. Many technologies
other than cellular phones have the potential to distract
drivers and increase the risk of our roads. The U.S. gov-
ernment has chosen not to regulate some of these tech-
nologies; car radios are an example. Others, such as e-mail,
Web browsing, fax machines, or cellular phones, may be reg-
ulated. We strongly encourage governments to consider
the economics of such choices before implementing a
potentially costly regulation.
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